A Patent Doctrine without Bounds: The "Extended"
Written Description Requirement
Guang Ming Whitleyt
Adequate disclosure is the "quid pro quo" of the patent system:
the public grants exclusive rights to the patent holder for a limited
time, and in exchange, the patent holder divulges the operating principles of the invention to the public.' Since adequacy of disclosure determines a patent's validity and scope, the Supreme Court has cau-

tioned against "[f]undamental alterations in [disclosure] rules" that
may "risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their
property" by invalidating pending or issued patents. 2 The current standard for adequate disclosure, set forth in 35 USC § 112, requires that

the
specification . .. contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled

in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.'

Courts have interpreted this statute to include two separate requirements that valid patents must fulfill: "written description" and

"enablement."4
Traditionally, the written description requirement served as a priority policing doctrine, preventing patent applicants from improperly
amending claims after submitting an initial application. In this way, the
written description requirement foiled attempts to add new matter to
a patent through the amendment process while retaining the benefit

t
cago.
I

B.S. 2001, University of Southern California; J.D. Candidate 2004, The University of Chi-

Kewanee Oil Co v Bicron Corp, 416 US 470,484 (1974).
Festo Corp v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, 535 US 722.739 (2002).
3
35 USC § 112 (2000) (emphasis added). A patent specification begins with the written
description and concludes with the patent claims. The written description describes the what and
the why of the invention in paragraph form and may also include drawings and diagrams. The
patent claims are numbered and define the scope of the patent rights in a formal manner.
4
In re Curtis,354 F3d 1347, 1357 (Fed Cir 2004) ("We interpret 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 to require a written description requirement separate and apart from the enablement requirement.").
The adequate disclosure standard also requires that the specification set forth the "best mode"
for carrying out the invention. 35 USC § 112. The best-mode requirement is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
2
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of an earlier filing date.' Thus, the written description requirement has
traditionally served procedural goals in the patent system, allowing
the government to effectively administer the priority of competing
patents.
In contrast to the policing function of the written description requirement, the enablement requirement ensures that "public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims."6 Thus, the enablement requirement seeks to fulfill the substantive goal of adequate disclosure
in the patent system: the patent specification must enable one skilled
in the art "to make and use the claimed invention without undue
experimentation.
The enablement requirement, as articulated in In re Wands,' once
served as the primary method for determining whether a patent claim
was adequately disclosed." However, recent and rapid developments in
technology have stretched the Federal Circuit's enablement analysis.
The Wands test for enablement of a claim fails to capture the nuances
of determining adequate disclosure in complex and emerging fields.
While the test considers the predictability of the relevant art, it does
not enumerate specific criteria for determining adequate disclosure in
unpredictable arts. As a result of the test's inadequacy, patents granted
in unpredictable fields such as biotechnology may include overbroad
claims that exceed the scope of what was known at the time the patent
application was filed. The enablement analysis must be sufficient to
distinguish overbroad claims from claims that are adequately disclosed by the patent specification.
In 1997, the Federal Circuit set out to cure the deficiencies in
Wands by extending the scope of the written description requirement.' The court's revised analysis treated written description as an
adequate disclosure doctrine to be applied in addition to the test for
enablement." When the Federal Circuit extended the application of
the written description requirement beyond priority policing and as a
substantive test for adequate disclosure, it attempted to provide courts
with a way to invalidate patent claims that withstood the original
5 See Application of Hogan. 559 F2d 595,608 (CCPA 1977), citing Application of Bowen,
492 F2d 859,864 (CCPA 1974), and Application of Smythe, 480 F2d 1376,1385 (CCPA 1973).
6
National Recovery Technologies, Inc v Magnetic Separation Systems Inc, 166 F3d 1190,
1196 (Fed Cir 1999).
7 Adang v Fischhoff,286 F3d 1346,1355 (Fed Cir 2002) (emphasis added).
8 858 F2d 731 (Fed Cir 1988).
9
See Enzo Biochem, Inc v Gen-Probe Inc, 42 Fed Appx 439, 446 (Fed Cir 2002) (Rader
dissenting).
10 See id.
II See Regents of the University of California v Eli Lilly and Co, 119 F3d 1559, 1567 (Fed
Cir 1997) (invalidating a claim for lack of written description).
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Wands enablement analysis but failed to adequately disclose the operation of complex new technologies.
Unfortunately, the court overshot its goal, creating a nebulous
doctrine that could be used in a discretionary fashion by courts or juries to invalidate almost any patent claim. In so doing, the Federal
Circuit appears to have ignored the Supreme Court's warning that
"courts must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community."'2 Indeed, by creating a
new substantive requirement for adequate disclosure without sufficient guidelines to cabin judicial discretion, the Federal Circuit has introduced new risk into the patent process. A doctrine granting too
much discretion to the decisionmaker renders results uncertain and
reduces an inventor's ex ante expectation for the scope of her patent's
protection. Moreover, the lack of factors guiding the court's analysis
might give rise to constitutional problems, since the unbounded discretion created by this new substantive requirement holds "the potential to deny similarly situated individuals equal treatment under the
laws.""
This Comment attempts to cure the problems with the Federal
Circuit's current use of the written description requirement as a substantive test for adequate disclosure by limiting judicial discretion and
clarifying adequate disclosure requirements. Part I explores the development of the written description requirement and its relationship to
the enablement requirement. Part II considers the extended written
description requirement's lack of clear boundaries and retroactive application, which allow the decisionmaker to invalidate almost any patent claim for lack of written description. Part III proposes that the test
for written description be combined with the original Wands enablement factors, using the goal of adequate disclosure to cabin discretionary application of the written description requirement. This solution limits judicial discretion, lends clarity to the adequate disclosure
requirements, and simultaneously harmonizes existing case law and alleviates concerns about adequate disclosure in emerging technologies.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE STANDARD

A. The Written Description Requirement
The original purpose of the written description requirement was
to police priority in new or amended claims. Subject to certain limitaFesto. 535 US at 739.
1- John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit. 52 Am U L Rev 771. 791 (2003) (discussing discretion and nonobviousness).
14 See Application of Bowen. 492 F2d 859.864 (CCPA 1974). See also Application of Smith.
481 F2d 910.914 (CCPA 1973).
12
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tions, patent applicants may amend their claims after submitting their
initial application, while retaining the original filing date for priority
purposes. This amendment process allows patent applicants to alter

existing claims without losing their place in the priority line. To preserve fairness, amendments must not introduce new matter into the
application. Priority policing statutes prevent patent holders from
misusing the amendment process. Thus, the original purpose of the
written description requirement set forth in 35 USC § 112 was identical to that of 35 USC § 132, which prohibits addition of "new matter
into the disclosure of the invention. '
B.

The Extended Written Description Requirement

In the 1997 decision Regents of the University of California v Eli
Lilly and Co,' the Federal Circuit extended the scope of the written
description requirement. Before Eli Lilly, the written description re-

quirement was used only procedurally as a priority policing doctrine
for claims amended or added after the original filing date. After Eli
Lilly, the written description requirement could also be used to invali-

date originallyfiled claims for "failure to provide an adequate written
description"17--that is, for lack of adequate disclosure. Thus, the written description requirement is currently applied in two contexts: priority policing and adequate disclosure.
Since the Eli Lilly court found a lack of written description
"[w]hether or not [the specification] provides an enabling disclosure,"
Eli Lilly requires patent applicants to show adequate disclosure

through both the enablement and the written description requirements.' This use of the written description requirement was entirely
novel. In Enzo Biochem, Inc v Gen-Probe Inc,2"'a divided Federal Cir-

15 35 USC § 132 (2000). Courts initially used both doctrines identically, noting that 'Ja] new
matter rejection under 35 USC § 132, predicated on claim language, is tantamount to a rejection
for lack of a written description of the claimed invention under 35 USC § 112." Application of
Hogan. 559 F2d 595,608 (CCPA 1977). citing Bowen, 492 F2d at 864, and Application of Smythe,
480 F2d 1376, 1385 (CCPA 1973). In 1981. the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) noted the confusion caused by the redundant doctrines. See In re Rasmussen, 650
F2d 1212, 1214 (CCPA 1981). The CCPA distinguished "the adding of new matter to the disclosure" from "the broadening of a claim," explaining that "[biroadening a claim does not add new
matter to the disclosure." Id.The court then concluded that § 112 (written description) was "[t]he
proper basis for rejection of a claim amended to recite elements thought to be without support
in the original disclosure," while § 132 applied to amendments to the specification. Id (emphasis
added).
16 119 F3d 1559 (Fed Cir 1997).
17
Idat 1567.
18 See Moba v Diamond Automation, Inc. 325 F3d 1306.1319 (Fed Cir 2003) ("Federal Circuit case law reflects two applications of 35 USC § 112.1 1").
19 Eli Lilly. 119 F3d at 1567 (emphasis added).
20 296 F3d 1316 (Fed Cir 2002).
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cuit affirmed2 Eli Lilly's interpretation of the written description
1
requirement.
The Relationship between the Enablement and Extended
Written Description Requirements

C.

The Federal Circuit has had difficulty articulating a function for
the extended written description requirement that is distinct from that
served by the enablement requirement. Indeed, one Federal Circuit
judge suggested that the court "has begun to convert [the written description requirement] into the enablement doctrine with a different
label."2 Decisions prior to Eli Lilly asserted that written description
and enablement were separate requirements. In those cases, however,
the doctrines were always applied in discrete spheres: written description related to priority while enablement related to adequate disclosure. When the written description requirement was extended, its
function became uncertain. Recent developments show that under the
Federal Circuit's current Eli Lilly test, the function of the extended
written description requirement is difficult to distinguish from that of
enablement.
1. Eli Lilly.
The dispute in Eli Lilly concerned broad claims for vertebrate
and mammalian cDNA encoding insulin, as well as a claim for a modified microorganism that would produce human insulin. 2' Rather than
perform an enablement determination, the Federal Circuit found that
the district court did not err in finding the claims invalid "for failure to
provide an adequate written description. ''
The fact pattern in Eli Lilly is similar to past Federal Circuit enablement determinations. In the context of cDNA encoding insulin,
the Eli Lilly court noted that it was not clear that "a description of a
species always constitutes a description of a genus of which it is a
part." This reasoning easily applies to enablement, where enablement
of one species that is part of a broader genus is not necessarily an enablement of the entire genus, especially in unpredictable arts.i1 The enablement requirement mandates that patent disclosures be sufficient
"to enable one skilled in the art to carry out the invention commensu-

22

Id at 1324-25.
Moba, 325 F3d at 1326 (Rader concurring).

23

Eli Lilly, 119 F3d at 1562-63.

21

Id at 1568.
Id.
26
See Spectra-Physics,Inc v Coherent, Inc, 827 F2d 1524. 1533 (Fed Cir 1987) ("If an invention pertains to an art where the results are predictable, e.g.. mechanical as opposed to chemical
arts, a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment.") (citations omitted).
24
25
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rate with the scope of [the patent] claims."27 At the time the Eli Lilly
patent was filed, the patentee had only developed a method for producing rat insulin cDNA, yet claimed methods for producing vertebrate, mammalian, and human insulin cDNA." The Eli Lilly court's invalidation of the broad claims supported only by a single embodiment
in an unpredictable art is standard in Federal Circuit enablement determinations. " Nonetheless, the court relied on the written description
requirement in invalidating the claims.
This new use of the written description requirement is problematic. Consider, for example, a patent claim that involves a well-known
DNA sequence commonly known as the obesity gene. Under Eli Lilly,
the specification must contain a sequential listing of each nucleotide
in the claimed DNA sequence in order for the claims to meet the written description requirement." Unlike the enablement requirement,
which is satisfied so long as those skilled in the art can reproduce the
patented item, this requirement is not cabined by any limiting principle. In the obesity example, one skilled in the art would know exactly
which nucleotides were involved if the claim referred to the obesity
gene. But under Eli Lilly's written description requirement, any patent
claim that did not disclose every nucleotide in the gene could be invalidated for lack of written description, regardless of the wellestablished principle of patent law that "a patent need not teach, and
preferably omits, what is well known in the art."" The Federal Circuit
has since backpedaled from this stringent standard for biotechnology
patents, holding that "the requirement may be satisfied if in the
knowledge of the art the disclosed function is sufficiently correlated to
a particular, known structure.""2 While this allows the inventor to refer
to a well-known amino acid sequence by name or basic structure to
satisfy the extended written description requirement, such disclosure
would be sufficient to enable the invention for one skilled in the art.
27
Amgen, Inc v Chugai Pharmaceutical Co, Ltd, 927 F2d 1200, 1213 (Fed Cir 1991) (emphasis added).
28 Eli Lilly, 119 F3d at 1562-63.
29
See, for example, Adang v Fischhoff, 286 F3d 1346, 1359-60 (Fed Cir 2002) (invalidating
claims where the working example involved a tobacco plant, while the patent claimed application of the technology to multiple plants): Enzo Biochem, Inc v Calgene, Inc, 188 F3d 1362. 1374
(Fed Cir 1999) (invalidating broad claims of antisense technology for prokaryotes eukaryotes.
cellular organisms, and viruses when E. coli was the only organism involved in the patent's working examples of antisense technology): In re Wright, 999 F2d 1557,1564 (Fed Cir 1993) (invalidating patent claims for all vaccines in all organisms against all RNA viruses when the patent's
working example involved a vaccine that immunized chickens against one RNA virus).
30 See Eli Lilly, 119 F3d at 1569 (holding that a claimed DNA sequence "is not defined or
described by the mere name 'cDNA," ... but requires a kind of specificity usually achieved by
means of the recitation of the sequence of nucleotides that make up the cDNA').
31 Hybritech,Inc v MonoclonalAntibodies, Inc, 802 F2d 1367, 1384 (Fed Cir 1986).
32 Amgen, Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc. 314 F3d 1313,1332 (Fed Cir 2003).
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The Eli Lilly court might have chosen to make enablement and
the extended written description requirement redundant: two sets of
factors yielding the same results and fulfilling the same goals. But the
court did not combine the doctrines. Instead, it created an additional
requirement for adequate disclosure; patent claims can be invalidated
for lack of written description whether or not they are enabled.
2. The Patent and Trademark Office guidelines.
In 2001, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
issued guidelines to aid its personnel "in their review of patent applications for compliance with the 'written description' requirement of
35 U.S.C. 112." The guidelines attempt to explain the Federal Circuit
standard for written description, which requires that the applicant
"convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of
the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention."'
These guidelines provide factors used to determine satisfaction of the
written description requirement in a post-Eli Lilly environment. The
guidelines also demonstrate the difficulty in articulating a distinct
function for the extended written description requirement.
The PTO first attempted to distinguish the goals of the written
description and enablement requirements: "The written description
requirement, a question of fact, ensures that the inventor conveys to
others that he or she had possession of the claimed invention; whereas,
the enablement requirement, a question of law, ensures that the inventor conveys to others how to make and use the claimed invention."'"
Still, the PTO's guidelines for determining adequate written description appear to serve the same function as enablement. Additionally, a
clear standard for possession in the context of adequate disclosure has
not been articulated. For the purposes of patent law, inventors cannot
show possession of an invention unless they also demonstrate that
they know how to make and use it, which necessarily means enabling
others to use it. Hence the difficulty in articulating a distinction between the possession standard for written description and the makeand-use standard of enablement.
Despite the PTO's attempt to resolve the problems created by Eli
Lilly, this slight difference in wording does not translate into a practical distinction in function. In fact, the PTO method for evaluating
written description overlaps in part with an enablement determina-

See Eli Lilly, 119 F3d at 1567.
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications under the 35 USC. 112, 9 1, "Written
Description" Requirement, 66 Fed Reg 1099,1099 (Jan 5,2001).
35 Vas-Cath, Inc v Mahurkar,935 F2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed Cir 1991).
36 66 Fed Reg at 1100 (cited in note 34) (emphasis added).
-3
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tion. This extended written description requirement thus "compounds
the confusion, increases the chances for error, and augments the expense of the trial process."" The lack of distinction between the enablement and written description requirements and the separate tests
for each create problems for both trial courts and juries. One Federal
Circuit judge noted that the jury was asked "to decide that the patent's disclosure can enable a skilled artisan to make and practice the
entire invention, but still not inform that same artisan that the inventor was in possession of the invention. Puzzling."''
The table below illustrates the relationship between the doctrines.
The left column contains PTO factors for evaluating the extended
written description requirement. The right column contains the Federal Circuit's factors for evaluating enablement (the Wands factors").
Ostensibly, the PTO factors place focus on demonstrating the patent
applicant's possession of the invention, while the Wands factors place
focus on whether the disclosure is sufficient to enable others to make
and use the invention. But both sets of factors lead to the same end:
disclosure that adequately demonstrates how to make and use the invention. Thus, both sets of factors attempt to ensure that adequate disclosure-the quid pro quo of patent law-is fulfilled. As such, the extended written description requirement cannot have a purpose that is
separate and distinct from enablement. The extended written description requirement could, however, add valuable considerations to the
enablement test, especially in the unpredictable arts. The PTO guidelines place a specific focus on reduction to practice, drawings and diagrams, and distinguishing characteristics that is lacking in the current
enablement analysis.
PTO Written Description Factors "
* Evidence of support in the
application
* Actual reduction to practice
* Clear depiction in detailed drawings or chemical formulas
* Disclosure of relevant, distinguishing, and identifying
characteristics
* Level of skill and knowledge in
the art
* Predictability of the art
* Full scope of the claim

37
38

Moba, 325 F3d at 1323 (Rader concurring).

39

Wands, 858 F2d at 737.
66 Fed Reg at 1104-06 (cited in note 34).
Wands. 858 F2d at 737.

40
41

Id.

Wands Enablement Factors"
9 Quantity of experimentation
necessary
* Amount of direction or guidance presented
* Presence or absence of working
examples
9 Nature of the invention
* State of the prior art
* Relative skill of those in the art
9 Predictability or unpredictability
of the art
0 Breadth of the claim
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3. Enzo Biochem.

Enzo Biochem reveals the Federal Circuit's struggle to articulate
a clear standard for the extended written description requirement. Initially, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for invalidity of the patent claims for lack of written
description. 2 Three months later, the Federal Circuit vacated its prior
decision and remanded." After entry of the decision, an en banc poll
failed, with three judges concurring in and three judges dissenting
from the decision against hearing the appeal." The concurring judges
agreed that the law of written description was sound. ' The dissenters
wished to resolve the confusion surrounding application of the written
description requirement by overruling Eli Lilly and restricting written
description to its original function as a priority policing doctrine.46 This
tension within the Federal Circuit is emblematic of the difficulty in defining the extended written description requirement.
The Federal Circuit addressed an issue of first impression in Enzo
Biochem,"7 which further blurred the distinction between the enablement and extended written description requirements. The court held
that "reference in the specification to a deposit in a public depository,
which makes its contents accessible to the public when it is not otherwise available in written form, constitutes an adequate description of
the deposited material sufficient to comply with the written description requirement of § 112, 9 1.,,4" Biological deposits have long been
held to fulfill the enablement requirement.'9 One can comply with enablement by depositing "living materials in cell depositories which will
distribute samples to the public who wish to practice the invention after the patent issues.." The Enzo Biochem court noted that a "deposit

in a public depository most often has pertained to satisfaction of the
enablement requirement," but concluded that "reference in the specification to a deposit may also satisfy the written description requirement with respect to a claimed material."'"
42 Enzo Biochen.285 F3d at 1015.
43 Enzo Biochem, Inc v Gen-Probe Inc, 296 F3d 1316,1320 (Fed Cir 2002).
44 Enzo Biochen, Inc v Gen-Probe Inc, 42 Fed Appx 439 (Fed Cir 2002) (denial of petition
to rehear the case en banc).
45
46

Id at 444-45.
ld at 445.

47

296 F3d at 1325.

48 Id. A biological deposit is a sample of living material stored in a cell depository. See
Wands, 858 F2d at 735. The depository distributes samples of this material to those who wish to
practice the invention after the patent issues. Id.
49 See Wands. 858 F2d at 735, citing Application of Argoudelis. 434 F2d 1390, 1392-93
(CCPA 1970).
50 Wands, 858 F2d at 735.
51 Enzo Biochem.296 F3d at 1326.
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Enzo Biochem sued Gen-Probe for patent infringement. 2 GenProbe moved for summary judgment, asserting that multiple claims in
Enzo Biochem's patent were invalid for lack of written description.'
In considering Gen-Probe's assertions, the Federal Circuit adopted the
PTO guidelines for the extended written description requirement."
On remand, the Federal Circuit instructed the district court to determine whether "the written description, including information obtainable from the deposits of the claimed sequences" was "sufficient to
demonstrate possession of the generic scope of the claims."" Because
the patent specification referred to the biological deposits, "it may
well be that various subsequences, mutations, and mixtures of those
sequences are also described to one of skill in the art."' Like Eli Lilly
and other Federal Circuit enablement determinations, the Enzo Biochem decision involved broad claims relying on a narrow disclosure.
The court's instructions and considerations did little to distinguish the purpose of the extended written description requirement
from that of enablement. Relying entirely on the Eli Lilly version of
the extended written description requirement, the court did not address whether the claims "implicate other validity issues, such as enablement."" Nevertheless, the court's discussion of the adequacy of
the biological deposits appears to turn on whether the biological deposits enable one skilled in the art to make and use the various subsequences, mutations, and mixtures of those sequences. The court's
analysis of the patent's disclosure indicates that the underlying goal of
extended written description mirrors that of enablement.
II. PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS WITH THE EXTENDED
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT

A. Confusion in Practical Application
Since Eli Lilly and Enzo Biochem, the Federal Circuit has attempted to limit the extended written description requirement. In
Amgen, Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc," the court "clarified that

Eli Lilly did not hold that all functional descriptions of genetic material necessarily fail as a matter of law to meet the written description
requirement.' " While this does reduce the ponderous disclosure re-

52
53

54
55
56
57
58

59

Idat 1320.
Id.
Idat 1325.
Id at 1327.
Id at 1326-27.
Idat 1327 n2.
314 F3d 1313 (Fed Cir 2003).
Id at 1322, citing Enzo Biochem. 296 F3d at 1324.
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quired by Eli Lilly, it does little to explain what extended written description actually requires.
The holdings in several district court cases indicate the various
courts' confusion as to the meaning and boundaries of the doctrine. In
Abbott Laboratoriesv Inverness Medical Technology, an expert dem-

onstrated that it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art that
the description of a one-step assay in the patent specification would
be applicable to the multiple assays claimed in the patent.' Regardless, the court invalidated the claims for the other assays, holding that
the written description requirement is met only when any variants of
what is described are "not only obvious, but actually described."" At
the same time, the court noted that the specification does not have to
provide explicit support for the claimed subject matter. These notions
are contradictory: a court cannot require actual description without
requiring any explicit support. Such a holding provides little guidance
for prospective patent applicants.
The district court in University of Rochester v G.D. Searle & Co,

Inc' confused the distinction between enablement and written description. The court's discussion, while couched in terms of the written
description requirement, was really about enablement. In ostensibly
discussing the adequate written description requirement, the district
court stated that it "means little to 'invent' a method if one does not
have possession of a substance that is essential to practicing that
method."6' This reasoning is standard in an enablement determination.
When a method requires a particular apparatus or certain starting
chemicals, the patent application must provide a sufficient disclosure
of that apparatus or those chemicals in order to be enabled.'
Retroactive Application

B.

The extended written description requirement raises questions
about the validity of claims in existing patents. It purports to require
more than an enabling disclosure in the specification, imposing an additional burden on patent applicants. 7 This additional requirement
applies retroactively to patents issued when the primary disclosure

6(

2002 US Dist LEXIS 15290 (D Mass).

61 Id at *6.

Id at *7.
249 F Supp 2d 216 (WD NY 2003).
Idat 221-30.
64
Id at 228.
65
66 See Application of Ghiron, 442 F2d 985. 991 (CCPA 1971). See also In re Howarth. 654
F2d 103,105 (CCPA 1981).
67 See Eli Lilly, 119 F3d at 1567 (finding a claim invalid for lack of written description even
if it was found to be enabled).
62
63
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doctrine was enablement." In 1997, Eli Lilly extended the written description requirement and invalidated patent claims filed in 1977 and
1979;" the 2002 Enzo Biochem decision applied the requirement to a
patent filed in 1986."
Inventors have no opportunity to remedy deficiencies in disclosures that comply with the enablement requirement but may be inadequately described under Eli Lilly's nebulous standard. There is a
high probability that retroactive application of the extended written
description requirement will become a common problem in patent
litigation. Because Eli Lilly requires description beyond that needed
to fulfill the enablement requirement, defendants will likely invoke
the broad reach of the extended written description requirement
when litigating adequacy of disclosure. This retroactive application is a
fundamental alteration of the requirements for disclosure and affects
patent holders' expectations in the scope of their rights."
C.

Lack of Boundaries
The extended written description requirement is currently applied without a limiting principle, leaving much discretion to judges in
determining the validity of patent claims. This expansive discretion
disrupts the expectations of inventors and increases the risk involved
in obtaining a patent, as claims can be arbitrarily invalidated. The
original written description requirement was limited by the search for
new matter." The enablement requirement is limited by the goal of
adequate disclosure (that is, "enabling" one skilled in the art to make
and use the claimed invention)." But the boundary of the extended
written description requirement is perplexing: an inventor must convey that "he or she was in possession of the invention,"" or that he or
she "invented the claimed invention,"" through the written description
itself. The Federal Circuit has done little to elaborate on these
boundaries, giving judges potentially limitless discretion to invalidate
claims in both predictable and unpredictable arts.'6 In CarnegieMellon
See id at 1562-63. See also Enzo Biochen 296 F3d at 1326.
See Eli Lilly. 119 F3d at 1562-63.
741 See Enzo Biochemn,296 F3d at 1326.
71 See Festo Corp v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, 535 US 722, 739 (2002)
(cautioning against fundamental changes to patent requirements).
72
See. for example. Application of Hogan. 559 F2d 595.608 (CCPA 1977).
73
Adang v Fischhoff. 286 F3d 1346,1355 (Fed Cir 2002).
74
Vas-Cath v Mahurkar. 935 F2d 1555.1564 (Fed Cir 1991).
75 Eli Lilly, 119 F3d at 1566.
76 See Pasquale A. Razzano. Conflicts in Federal Circuit Patent Law Decisions.
11 Fed Cir
Bar J 723. 725 (2001) ("The Federal Circuit has not provided clear and consistent rules for determining precisely what type of disclosure is sufficient to comply with the § 112 written description requirement.").
68

69
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University v Three Rivers Biologicals, Inc," the district court invalidated biotech claims for lack of written description. The court held
that application of Eli Lilly is not limited to claims involving novel
genes or DNA sequences." By suggesting that even claims in the predictable arts require explication of every detail, the court contradicted
the well-established principle that "a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art."" Though the Federal Circuit has since explained that Eli Lilly does not invalidate known sequences or genes,"' that change in the law could not alter the district
court's outcome. Still, the written description requirement could conceivably invalidate any invention that claims more than it specifically
describes. ' This creates significant validity problems for patents issued
before Eli Lilly, and increases the burden on patent applicants for future inventions.
The unclear boundaries of the extended written description requirement mean inventors have no way of knowing if their patents are
adequately described. To compensate for this uncertainty, inventors
will likely attempt to guarantee the validity of their patents through
voluminous patent disclosures. Such disclosures would be unduly burdensome, both on the patentee and on those who wish to practice the
invention. Furthermore, it is well established in patent law that the
specification may leave out what is known in the art.) Inventors who
successfully convey to others how to make and use their claimed inventions may nonetheless find their rights in enabled claims eliminated. The Federal Circuit has not yet articulated any clear reason for
requiring additional description from the inventor when a patent already allows one skilled in the art to make and use the full scope of
the claimed invention without undue experimentation.
The extended written description requirement disrupts the quid
pro quo of the patent system and is confusing to the courts that must
apply Federal Circuit law. Unlike the other appellate courts,
"[w]henever a Federal Circuit panel makes an error interpreting the
patent code, every district court in the nation, and even every later
Federal Circuit panel, is obliged to follow and perpetuate the error.""'

148 F Supp 2d 1004 (ND Cal 2001).
Idat 1014.
79 Hybritech, Inc v Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc. 802 F2d 1367.1384 (Fed Cir 1986).
81) See Atngen.314 F3d at 1332.
81 See Razzano. II Fed Cir Bar J at 725 (cited in note 76) ("[The strictest approach requires the written description to delineate all of the claimed elements.").
See Paperless Accounting, Inc v Bay Area Rapid Transit System. 804 F2d 659. 664 (Fed
82
Cir 1986).
83
Moba v Diamond Automation, Inc. 325 F3d 1306. 1322 (Fed Cir 2003) (Rader concur77

78
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This structure burdens district courts and juries with the problems of
the extended written description requirement.
III. CONSIDERING THE SOLUTIONS

A. The Proposed Solution
The Federal Circuit's reasoning in Eli Lilly indicates that the extension of the written description requirement was an attempt to
compensate for deficiencies in the enablement requirement; the enablement factors alone do not provide sufficient guidance to courts
making decisions at the margins of technology. By requiring description beyond fulfillment of the enablement factors, the court created a
way to invalidate those broad claims that fulfill the technical test for
enablement but nonetheless fail to adequately disclose the subject of
the claim. Still, the Eli Lilly decision is flawed. The court's extension of
the written description requirement lacks a clear standard and purpose, resulting in unbounded judicial discretion to invalidate claims.
Such a doctrine does not advance "the goal of the patent system to actually put the claimed invention into the hands of the public."''
It is not viable to ask the Federal Circuit simply to move back to
the pre-Eli Lilly interpretation of the written description requirement
as suggested by several commentators." The court has affirmed Eli
Lilly and applied the extended written description requirement in
subsequent cases. Not only would such a solution force Federal Circuit
judges to concede error, it also would not solve the problems that
spawned the extended written description requirement. Nor is it viable to ask the court to ignore and eventually discard the requirement." In affirming Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit has clearly perceived
a need to reach beyond the enablement test to resolve issues of ade84 See Scott A. Chambers, "Written Description" and Patent Examination under the U.S
Patent and Trademark Office Guidelines, IP Litigator 9 (Sept-Oct 2000), reprinted online at
http://www.arnoldporter.com/pubs/filesWritten-Description-and Patent-Examination.pdf (visited Feb 18.2004) (arguing in favor of the current written description requirement).
85 See Sven J.R. Bostyn, Written Description after Enzo Biochem: Can the Real Requirement Step Forward Please?, 85 J Patent & Trademark Off Socy 131. 152 (2003) (suggesting limiting "the application of the written description requirement to cases where priority issues are involved"); Shraddha A. Upadhyaya, The Postniodern Written Description Requirement:An Analysis of the Application of the Heightened Written Description Requirement to Original Claints. 4
Minn Intel Prop Rev 65, 121 (2002) ("The written description requirement cannot and should
not serve any function other than to guarantee that subsequently filed claims are entitled to the
benefit of the original application.").
86 See Bostyn, 85 J Patent & Trademark Off Socy at 152 (cited in note 85) (suggesting. as
one possible solution, that courts "do away with the requirement"); Mark D. Janis. On Courts
Herding Cats: Contending with the "Written Description" Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent
Disclosure Doctrines), 2 Wash U J L & Pol 55.108 (2000) (suggesting that courts use enablement
as the dominant disclosure principle, making "reliance on the written description requirement ...
so rare that [it] could finally be discarded").
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quate disclosure. The court has identified a problem in the adequate
disclosure requirements and cannot ignore the problem even though
its initial solution was flawed. At the same time, the extended written
description requirement's problems preclude maintaining the status
quo. 7 One commentator has argued that the requirement could be retained as "a fail-safe mechanism that judges (or examiners) [could]
use in their discretion in hard cases.""' This solution, however, does not
resolve the problem of expansive judicial discretion triggered by the
extended written description requirement's lack of boundaries, nor
does it address cases where judicial discretion has already improperly
invalidated claims.
A better solution would distinguish between the abstract goal of
adequate disclosure and the practical tests for determining adequate
disclosure. Adequate disclosure would be the ultimate principle or
purpose; the tests are an approximation by which a court determines
whether that ultimate principle or purpose is fulfilled. The current enablement test is an insufficient approximation of the abstract goal of
adequate disclosure, while the extended written description requirement overcompensates for this insufficiency.
The new considerations provided by the extended written description requirement should be combined with the Wands enablement factors, creating a single test. The PTO factors place a specific
focus on the written description that is lacking in the current test for
enablement, emphasizing the "words, structures, figures, diagrams,
formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed invention."'" Combining
these factors with the enablement test factors would compensate for
the current test's deficiencies while creating a logical boundary: the
goal of adequate disclosure sufficient to enable one skilled in the art.
B.

The Solution in Practice

To the extent that this solution will apply retroactively, it will invalidate far fewer patents than the current extended written description requirement. As this solution is a modification in the test for enablement, it will have, in effect, a "retroactive" application. However,
since this solution is merely a clarification of the law and a provision
of additional guidelines to the enablement test, the supposed "retroactivity" should not affect valid claims. This solution ameliorates the
problems of the extended written description requirement by making
the standard for adequate disclosure clear-cut and explicit. The patent
87 But see Bostyn. 85 J Patent & Trademark Off Socy at 152 (cited in note 85) (suggesting,
in the alternative, "leav[ing] everything as it is under present case law").
8 Janis,2 Wash U J L & Pol at 107 (cited in note 86).
8' Lockwood v American Airlines, Inc. 107 F3d 1565,1572 (Fed Cir 1997).
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claims that would be invalidated under this new test should be invalidated for failure to fulfill the goal of adequate disclosure.
Consider the jury situation mentioned in Part I.C.2 involving the
issues of enablement and written description. There, the "jury faced
the cumbersome task of separating two doctrines for sufficiency of
disclosure in a patent."" Because the Federal Circuit has had difficulty
articulating the distinction between the enablement and extended
written description requirements, a jury can hardly be expected to understand the doctrines. Under the proposed solution, the only adequate disclosure doctrine to consider would be enablement. The modified enablement test would have a set of clearly defined factors, including those currently under the heading of the extended written description requirement. This would greatly clarify the disclosure requirements for the benefit of trial courts and juries.
Consider also the hypothetical posed in Part I.C.1 involving a
well-known DNA sequence commonly known as the obesity gene.
Under Eli Lilly, claims involving the obesity gene would be incorrectly invalidated unless the specification listed all nucleotides in the
sequence. While the Federal Circuit no longer requires a sequential
listing of each nucleotide in a claimed DNA sequence in order for the
claims to meet the extended written description requirement," it has
not set forth what disclosure would fulfill the requirement. Suppose a
patent claim involves a novel DNA sequence, a newly discovered gene
that correlates with the incidence of breast cancer. In almost any gene
sequence, "[m]any of the amino acids in the chain have substitutes
that may take their place without altering the functional properties of
the protein.' "2 Under the extended written description requirement, a
court may very well decide that every substitute must be included in
the specification, regardless of whether the patent was enabled. This
result does not consider that while an art as a whole may be unpredictable, certain elements of that art may be very predictable, including elements of a newly created gene sequence.
The extended written description requirement could potentially
be used to incorrectly invalidate claims in wholly predictable arts. In
Moba v DiamondAutomation, Inc,"' the Federal Circuit affirmed a dis-

trict court's application of the extended written description requirement without much analysis. This was the first time the Federal Circuit
applied the extended written description requirement to a mechanical
art, that of "high-speed egg processing machines."9' In Moba, the jury
94
91
92
93
94

Moba, 325 F3d at 1323 (Rader concurring).
See Amgen,314 F3d at 1332.
Moba,325 F3d at 1325 (Rader concurring).
325 F3d 1306 (Fed Cir 2003).
Id at 1309.
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found that a claim directed to "lifting eggs from a moving conveyor"
demonstrated "possession of the invention at the time of filing" and
was "not invalid for lack of an adequate written description."" While
the appropriate result was achieved, in predictable arts the extended
written description requirement could be applied to achieve particularly absurd results. In the extreme, a patent application for a wooden
mousetrap could be invalidated for lack of description of the nails and
hammer. Clearly this example would not occur, but similar results may
occur in slightly more complex yet predictable fields.
Suppose a patent's written description and drawings describe and
depict prefabricated shingles fixed together in groups of six." Suppose
further that the main patent claim is directed to prefabricated shingles
fixed together without specifying a particular number. This claim
would include prefabricated shingles in groups of any number. Under
the extended written description requirement, however, the claim
could be invalidated entirely or limited to shingles in groups of six.
The drawings and diagrams showed six shingles fixed together. The
written description discussed six shingles fixed together. Under the
proposed solution, a court would consider enablement under the
Wands factors and the extended written description factors combined.
Though the diagrams and written description teach six shingles fixed
together, the broad claim puts the public on notice that the inventor is
claiming all numbers of shingles fixed together. The predictability of
the art is also high, such that one skilled in the art would understand
that the shingles could be fixed together in any number.
Purported "Enabled but not Described" Claims

C.

Some have argued that there is a class of claims that is enabled
but not described, providing the patent holder with rights not contemplated (or deserved) at the time of filing."' Under this line of reasoning, the extended written description requirement would eliminate
this class of claims. This argument, however, is based on a flawed view
of the enablement requirement. Enablement requires that an inventor
enable one skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention
without undue experimentation through "full, clear, concise, and exact
terms."" It is difficult to comprehend how an enabled specification can
still fail to sufficiently describe the invention; if the inventor's disclosure suffices to enable others to reproduce the invention, it necessarily

Idat 1321.
96 Though the legal issue has been changed. the shingle patent hypothetical is taken from
the facts of Application of Barker.559 F2d 588,589-91 (CCPA 1977).
97 See Application of DiLeone,436 F2d 1404,1405 n 1 (CCPA 1971).
98 35USC§ 112.
95
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demonstrates that the inventor has possession of the claimed invention. The CCPA has attempted to elucidate: "[C]onsider the case
where the specification discusses only compound A and contains no
broadening language of any kind. This might very well enable one
skilled in the art to make and use compounds B and C; yet the class
consisting of A, B, and C has not been described.""
The CCPA illustration is accurate, yet misleading. If the specification describes and claims only A with no broadening language, but enables A, B, and C, the inventor cannot add claims for B and C under
the original written description requirement as a prioritypolicing doctrine."" In this context, the written description requirement would
serve the same purpose as the new matter prohibition of 35 USC
§ 132. If the patent describes A and claims the class of A, B, and C, the
patent is either: (1) not enabled because one skilled in the art would
not be able to make B and C without undue experimentation; or
(2) enabled because one skilled in the art would be able to make B
and C without undue experimentation. While A, B, and C have not
been literally described, the broad claim puts the public on notice regarding the scope of the claimed invention. Enablement would then
determine whether the written description is sufficient.
The CCPA illustration essentially describes most patent applications. Inventors draft claims broadly in order to protect against infringement. If some claims are broader than what is enabled by the
specification, those claims are invalidated. If claims broader than what
is described in the invention were invalid, only the narrowest claims
claiming specifically described embodiments would be valid. This cannot be what was contemplated by the CCPA. The Federal Circuit has
stated that in a predictable art, "a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment."'" A corollary is that a patent need
not describe every embodiment that falls within its claims.
In unpredictable arts, such as biotechnology, the specification for
an invention requires detailed disclosure and guidance to achieve enablement.!2 Description of one embodiment is likely insufficient to
enable a broad claim.' " Thus, a logical conclusion for both predictable
9" DiLeone,436 F2d at 1405 n 1.
IM Once the patent is granted, there is no issue with adequate disclosure if only compound
A is described and claimed. The specification may very well enable compounds B and C, but if
those compounds are not claimed, they are not part of "the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention." 35 USC § 112. Litigation under those circumstances would involve obviousness and the doctrine of equivalents. This, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
t0' Spectra-Physics Inc v Coherent, Inc, 827 F2d 1524, 1533 (Fed Cir 1987) (citations
omitted).
1012 See, for example, Application of Fisher,427 F2d 833, 839 (CCPA 1970) (rejecting claims.
in part, due to insufficient disclosure).
103 See id.
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and unpredictable arts is this: if the written description is sufficient to
enable the full scope of the claims, then embodiments claimed but not
described in the specification can be known to one skilled in the art
without a verbatim description. The CCPA illustration provides no
logical rationale for requiring more description than necessary to impart that knowledge.
D.

Supposed "Fortuitous Enablement"

"Fortuitous enablement" supposedly occurs when an inventor's
patent enables an invention that was not known at the time the patent
was filed. If the fortuitous invention were lucrative, an inventor would
receive a windfall, reaping undeserved benefits by suing for infringement or licensing the patent. This concern commonly arises in unpredictable arts, where a broad claim may encompass more embodiments
than expressly disclosed or even contemplated. One commentator has
suggested that "[w]ithout a heightened written description requirement, inventors could receive patent rights to sequences of which they
have no knowledge, in organisms with which they have never
worked."'" The same commentator asserted that the requirement will
invalidate overly broad patent claims that would stifle new areas of
research.'" A deeper analysis of enablement reveals that preventing
"fortuitous enablement" is well within the bounds of the enablement
requirement.
For an inventor to receive a "windfall," the fortuitous invention
must have been enabled "at the time the application was filed."'" Patent claims are limited by the state of technology as of the application's
filing date. Embodiments that are legitimately enabled are not fortuitous; the inventor contemplated those inventions as evidenced by his
or her broad claims. "In cases involving predictable factors, such as
mechanical or electrical elements, a single embodiment provides
broad enablement in the sense that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws."' 7 Therefore, in a
predictable art, "a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single
embodiment."'" In an unpredictable art, "the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the fac-

04 Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evohtion of the Enablement and Written Description
Requirements under 35 USC. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 Berkeley Tech L J 1233,
1260-61 (2000).
105 Id.
106 Adang v Fischhoff. 286 F3d 1346,1355 (Fed Cir 2002).
107 Fisher,427 F2d at 839.
M08 Spectra-Physics, 827 F2d

at 1533 (citations omitted).
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tors involved."" There can be no fortuitously enabled claims under
the enablement requirement: any embodiment that was not known at
the time the patent was filed would not be covered by the claims.
There is no room for discretion, as the standard is clear.
Though the grant of overly narrow claims provides no incentive
to invest in research and development, the grant of overly broad
claims may provide an inventor with rights to an entire field of technology. The extended written description requirement works to the extreme: even the narrowest claims could potentially be invalidated. In
Eli Lilly, for example, the Federal Circuit required a sequential listing
of each nucleotide in a claimed DNA sequence in order for the claims
to meet the written description requirement."" As the court has since
recognized, adopting this level of specificity as a patent standard for
all claims is without justification in patent policy and onerous for inventors. Still, such specificity may be necessary under the enablement
requirement in certain cases. If genetic sequencing is highly unpredictable, then a patent likely cannot claim more than the sequence of
nucleotides it explicitly describes. After all, one must be enabled to
make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation."'

If the Eli Lilly court requires disclosure of sequences that are not
known in the art, then it is merely requiring an enabling disclosure.
Once certain areas of technology become more predictable, less disclosure will be required.
CONCLUSION

Contrary to the basic quid pro quo of patent law, the extended
written description requirement requires more specific disclosure than
necessary to enable the claimed invention. The limits of the extended
written description requirement have yet to be clearly defined, sowing
doubt and uncertainty among inventors without serving any beneficial
purpose. Subsuming the extended written description requirement
under the enablement requirement would greatly clarify the requirements of adequate disclosure by emphasizing that enablement is the
limiting principle. When used in this way, the extended written description factors enrich the enablement analysis and help to ensure
that the goal of adequate disclosure is fulfilled.
The arguments in favor of the freestanding extended written description requirement do not withstand scrutiny. There is little historical support for the Eli Lilly interpretation of the written description
109 Fisher,427 F2d at 839. There would of course be evidentiary issues in showing what was
known in the art at that time.
1i0 Eli Lilly, 119 F3d at 1569.
III Adang,286 F3d at 1355.
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requirement. In light of the quid pro quo of patent law, it is difficult to
justify requiring written description beyond that which enables the
claimed invention. Maintaining the current written description trend is
confusing, vague, and unnecessary, and will result in overly extensive
disclosures and unnecessary invalidation of existing patent claims.
Combining the factors for the extended written description and enablement requirements would assist courts in invalidating claims that
may satisfy the current enablement factors without fulfilling the requirement of adequate disclosure. Such a change would not disturb
the general structure of patent law, but would merely collapse a recently created disclosure doctrine into the established enablement requirement. Altering the extended written description requirement in
this manner would also preserve the expectations of inventors.
The extended written description requirement is not well established, well defined, or deeply rooted. Enablement is a powerful disclosure doctrine that should not be relegated to secondary importance. Collapsing the extended written description requirement into
the enablement requirement is a positive, feasible, and necessary step
in the development of patent law.
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